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Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life is a critical discussion of the logic of
sovereignty and the production of refugees in the contemporary international system. However I will argue
in this paper that Agamben’s discussion of refugees, like many others, reproduces a discourse that forecloses
moments of refugee agency and the possibilities for systemic change. Instead, I will attempt to draw out a
narrative that emphasizes the importance of refugee agency and the acts that challenge the discourses of pity
and exclusion with reference to refugees. By relying on the works of Jacques Rancière, Hannah Arendt, Carl
Schmitt, and others, I hope to illustrate that the agency of the refugee is less divorced from the political
projects within sovereign nation-states than these discourses tend to suggest. To accomplish this goal I will
focus on three levels of analysis: the abstract, the institutional, and the personal. At the abstract or conceptual
level I will argue that the logic of sovereignty forecloses discussion of agency and change. At the institutional
level I will explore the manifestations of refugee agency in the movements of the sans-papiers in France and
the Non-Status Algerian in Canada. At the personal level I will discuss how agency emerges in the spaces
of ‘bare life’ and how sovereignty is inscribed on the refugee body. Through this analysis I hope to explore
how the inclusions and exclusions of sovereignty can be challenged by the agency of the refugee.      
The Conceptual
Agamben’s discussion of sovereignty is an important starting point because it outlines the limits and
exclusions of the logic of sovereignty. Sovereignty is the point from which a discussion of refugee agency
must begin, because it is the primary concept that creates, sustains, and reproduces the concept of ‘the
refugee.’ Sovereign territorial states provide not only the borders between each other, this sovereignty
demarcates the boundaries between citizens and non-citizens as well as the realms of the political, the
national and the international creating quite literally an ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ (Walker 1992). Agamben,
following Schmitt argues that “the primary exclusion is that of the sovereign itself; the power to make and
suspend the law…lies outside sovereignty” (Agamben 1998: 15). However, unlike Schmitt, Agamben
examines the conceptual limits of sovereignty by illustrating the secondary exception that constitutes
sovereign rule. These are the individual cases that violate the rule or prohibition of law, but fail to invalidate
the law as such. In Agamben’s words: “Inscribed as a presupposed exception in every rule that orders or
forbids something (for example, in the rule that forbids homicide) is the pure and unsanctionable figure of
the offense that, in the normal case, brings about the rule’s own transgression” (Ibid.: 21).
Thus sovereignty is defined by two exceptions; the first is the exclusion of the sovereign from the field of
sovereignty, and second is the exclusion of every specific case from the rule of sovereignty itself. As I will
discuss shortly, the result of the internal logic of sovereignty is to produce the field of ‘Being’ (or ontology)
upon which the entire political order is founded. While Agamben delves into the complexities of these
inclusions and exclusions, his distinction is important because it illustrates how the logic of sovereignty
denies its own contingency by making every situation a site of exclusion. As we shall see shortly, this has
specific ramifications in the production of the exception between bare and sacred life.  
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Agamben’s discussion of the distinction between zoç (the life common to all living beings) and bios (the
form of living as an individual or group) founds his distinction between sacred and bare life (Ibid.: 1). Sacred
life or homo sacer is the inclusion of bare life (or zoç) within the field of sovereignty as the homo sacer; a
life that can be killed but not sacrificed (Ibid.: 83). While the inclusion within society makes the life sacred
(distinct from bare life) the price of this inclusion is the necessary production of the exclusion that makes
homicide possible (Ibid.: 82).  In Agamben’s words “The sacredness of life, which is invoked today as an
absolutely fundamental right in opposition to sovereign power, in fact originally expresses…life’s subjection
to a power over death and life” (Ibid.: 83). The implications of this distinction are ominous and clear. If
someone was to be banned from the realm of sovereign power, their status would revert to a form of bare life,
where the sovereign exception of homicide would cease to function. As Agamben examines throughout his
book, the logic of sovereign exception coupled with the nation-state enables the emergence of the refugee
and the camp, where the reemergence of bare life becomes possible. Thus the logic of sovereignty is an
important starting point for understanding the creation of the refugee and the possibilities for a narrative of
refugees that emphasizes their agency.
With homo sacer in mind, the possibilities for agency from the site of the excluded seems remote if not
impossible. However, much like Agamben’s book, this is a result of the examination of logic of sovereignty
rather than an emphasis on the contingent nature of sovereign power. This stems from Agamben’s reading
of Aristotle, that while important, forecloses ‘potentiality’ for a better understanding of ‘actuality.’ This is
because Agamben discusses the importance of sovereignty as fully constituted (i.e., the logic of sovereign
power) and rightly so, as this is the only conceptual space from which the logic of sovereignty makes sense.
The problem resides in the way that this also forecloses the discussion of potentiality and subsumes it in what
Slavoj Žižek calls the ‘positive order of Being.’ Thus while we may make a distinction between constituting
and constituted sovereignty, Agamben argues that “according to Aristotle’s thought, potentiality precedes
actuality and conditions it, but also seems to remain essentially subordinate to it” (Ibid.: 45). In other words,
we are situated in a site of constituted power that only allows us to view potentiality retroactively and distinct
from the present. In his words: “This is why if potentiality is to have its own consistency and not always
disappear immediately into actuality, it is necessary that potentiality be able to not to pass over into actuality”
(Ibid.).
This gap between potentiality and actuality or ‘Becoming’ and ‘Being’ provides the basis of the logic of
sovereignty. As a result “potentiality…is that through which Being founds itself soverignly, which is to say,
without anything preceding it or determining it” (Ibid.: 46). The result of this is a logic of sovereignty that
negates its own potentiality to realize its actuality or as was illustrated above, the denial of contingency in
the form of Being. The denial of its potentiality in the form of actuality is also the moment when the
exclusions of sovereignty emerge. At a conceptual level, thinking from the logic of sovereignty (and there
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is no way to think of sovereignty otherwise) forecloses the potentiality that the exclusion (as both inside and
outside the law) of the refugee represents.
What this account of sovereignty is missing is the subjectivity that provides the supplement to the existing
ontological order by examining sovereignty from its internal logic. Žižek has argued such accounts of the
consistency of Being miss the supplement that the ‘act’ provides. To employ this argument against Agamben
shows that:    
It puts too much trust in the positive order of Being, overlooking the fact that the order of
being is never simply given, but is itself grounded in some preceding Act. There is no Order
of Being as a positive ontologically consistent Whole: the false semblance of such an Order
relies on the self-obliteration of the act (Žižek 1999: 238).
These acts are the supplement that allows Being to maintain its consistency and disavow its contingent
character. From the internal logic of sovereignty such acts are sites of exclusion, but they are also the
supplement which allows sovereignty to appear as a logic as such. Thus while sovereignty appears as a
consistent logic, it requires ongoing acts to manifest this consistency. This is critical because Agamben’s
analysis fails to elucidate the centrality of the act (rather than the exception) as the basis of the consistency
of sovereignty. By reasserting the importance of the act we can recover agency, both from sites inside the
logic of sovereignty and in the spaces of exclusion.
A clarification of subjectivity is important at this point. While the ontological consistency internal to the
logic of sovereignty seems to imply that there are political subjects and non-subjects (which as we will see
below occur at the political level) at a conceptual level, the consistency of sovereignty depends on the
obliteration of the act, rather than the subject. If we take Žižek’s argument on this point, within the Lacanian
framework, there is no ‘subject’ prior to the act, rather, that “‘subject’ designates the contingency of an Act
that sustains the very ontological order of being” (Ibid.: 160). Sovereignty relies on the production of subjects
within the exclusionary space to accommodate the acts which maintain its consistency.
While there are many different definitions and understandings of the Act, bearing in mind the emphasis on
refugee agency advocated in this paper, Jacques Rancière’s discussion of this point is relevant here. He
retains a similar emphasis on the excluded by arguing that ‘the people’ which is used as the foundation of
political institutions such as democracy excludes all of those who cannot participate, such as the poor
(Rancière 1999: 9-10). These members of society who have no part, who do not participate, form the primary
exclusion of the community itself. However, unlike Agamben, Rancière sees this excluded space as the site
of the political rather than a space of bare life. As Rancière argues:
Politics does not exist because men, through the privilege of speech place their interests in
common. Politics exists because those who have no right to be counted as speaking beings
make themselves of some account, setting up a community by the fact of placing in common
a wrong that is nothing more than this very confrontation (Ibid.: 27).
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In reference to Agamben, the exclusionary space created by sovereignty cannot be a space of sovereign
power, but it can still function as a political place. This politics is beyond the logic of sovereignty because
it exists in the place of the exclusion, where bare life has no sovereign voice. The notion of the Act then
becomes paramount because while it provides consistency to the logic of sovereignty, it can also emerge in
the place of the excluded and provide the foundation for a politics. Thus while Agamben provides a critical
foundation for understanding the logic of sovereignty, his analysis reproduces the exclusions he outlines by
adopting a position within this logic. Only by working through the abstract do we begin to see why agency
is integral to the political manifestations of sovereignty and how the refugee act is the source of this politics.
The Political/Institutional
The differentiation of the conceptual and the political is important because of the way sovereignty manifests
itself. As we see in Agamben, from the logic of sovereignty every material instance of sovereign power is
manifest by the exception to its rule. This is why Peter Nyers points out that the activism of the refugee
represents an “impossible activism” precisely because the refugee is not a political subject (they are non-
citizens) and have no right to a speaking position (Nyers 2003: 1080). Thus as Nyers and Bonnie Honig agree
with Rancière in reference to the refugee, we must conceptualize them as a form of taking-subject rather than
one who has been granted sovereign rights as a component of their citizenship (Ibid.: 1077). Their actions
become the claim on which their political voice is manifest even in the place of exclusion (the camp or
detention centre. The idea of refugee as political agent then provides a starting point to outline how the
refugee-as-agent has emerged in discourses about refugees.
In the immediate post-war period, refugees emerged as a ‘problem’ to be solved. As Hannah Arednt outlined
in Imperialism, the convergence of nationality and sovereignty in the modern European nation-state produced
a system like the one before it “which had never taken into account or responded to the needs of at least 25
percent of her [sic] population” (Arendt 1951: 151). Efforts such as the minority treaties were never able to
deal with the problem that in some cases reached the absurd level where “the nationally frustrated peoples
constitute 50 percent of the local population” (Ibid.: 152). As these groups were constituted as an exception
in the spaces between the sovereign rule of nation-states, they became a ‘problem’ to be dealt with. 
The characterization of refugees as a ‘problem’ reinforces their abject status and continues to the present day.
A cursory examination of the introduction of the latest State of the World Refugees illustrates this
representation of “desperate people fleeing” or the “suffering of uprooted people” reinforcing the idea of
powerless refugees that provides the impetus for the United Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees’
(UNHCR) state-centric goal of “solving refugee problems” (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees 2000: 1,3,4). The portrait of refugees as humanitarian objects in need of rescue is a pervasive
mobilization tactic has been increasingly recognized as enacting a range of other violences upon refugees
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(to which I will return later). Efforts to develop more attentive responses to the refugee ‘problem’ under the
guise of ‘New Humanitarianism’ call for the adoption of the Hippocratic oath in an effort to minimize harm
(Anderson 1996). Thus the refugee ‘problem’ is deepened by transforming the ‘well-founded fear of
persecution’ (upon which the current definition of refugee relies) into a psycho-physical problem that
refigures refugee agency within a medical discourse. The failure to deal with the refugee ‘problem’ reinforces
the abject status of the refugee while transforming the issue into depolictized product of the inter-state
system.
Thus it is useful to return to Arendt’s analysis of the refugee ‘problem’ to repoliticize the contemporary
efforts to do the opposite. Firstly, and most simply, Arendt recognizes that the right of asylum that pre-dates
the nation-state and there is a long-standing expectation that stateless people are prone to seek refuge in other
countries (Arendt 1951: 160). Herein lies a simple distinction that is often overlooked, namely that migration
and mobility has taken place throughout history. Rather than see it as an exception, it should be treated as
a norm that emphasizes the mobility and agency of the one seeking refuge. Refugees are actors that make
choices about mobility like everyone else. As Fiona Terry points out in her discussion of the Arabic term
mohajir, flight can be seen as a positive experience of agency rather than an abject source of exclusion (Terry
2002: 76). As she points out: “A mohajir is a person who voluntarily takes exile and has severed ties with
relatives and possessions, thus denoting courage for sacrificing comfort and family, rather than shame at
taking flight” (Ibid.).
Thus a reading of Arendt’s point in this light illustrates the possibility that mobility and refuge does not mean
an elimination of agency, rather the possibility that a productive end that can come from flight. Based in
Mohammad’s flight in exile, the mohajir is a time of building support for a victorious return, grounded in
the idea that flight is an empowering tactic, rather than a disempowering expulsion (Ibid.). This idea of return
presented a second problem that Arednt (1951) outlined:  
The second great shock that the European world suffered through the arrival of refugees was
the realization that it was impossible to get rid of them or transform them into nationals of
the country of refuge. From the beginning everybody had agreed that there were only two
ways to solve the problem: repatriation or naturalization (161).
The logic of the nation-state foreclosed alternative possibilities that could have normalized their status rather
than trying to eliminate the ‘problem.’ However, what is most interesting in Arendt’s discussion is how these
two options encountered resistance from the refugees and stateless themselves:
The stateless people had already shown a surprising stubbornness in retaining their
nationality; in every sense the refugees represented separate foreign minorities who
frequently did not care to be nationalized, and they never banded together, as the minorities
had done temporarily, to defend common interests (Ibid.: 162).
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Arendt outlines how efforts to repatriate or naturalize failed because they were intimately wedded to a nation-
state that was producing the ‘problem’ they were attempting to ‘solve.’ The refugee’s identification with
nationality did not correspond with the single nationality of the nation-state. As she notes: “Even though they
had renounced their citizenship, no longer had any connection with or loyalty to their country of origin, and
did not identify their nationality with a visible, fully recognized government, they retained a strong
attachment to their nationality (Ibid.: 163).”
 
The convergence of the modern sovereign state with the idea of a single nation produced the refugee
‘problem’ that it could not resolve. The equation of the logic of sovereignty with the idea of one nation
produces the ‘paradox’ that most discussions of refugees still remain mired (see Terry 2002). Recapturing
the agency of the refugee is important to prevent state-centric solutions from reproducing the exclusions that
sovereignty, by its own logic, must create.
The result of this is to question as many others have, the way that nation-states look for ‘solutions’ (most
notoriously the ‘Final Solution’) to deal with this refugee ‘problem.’  Unfortunately – and I argue this is the
result of ignoring the agency of the refugee – these solutions fall to security and policing apparatus of the
state. As Arendt explains: “the nation state, incapable of providing a law for those who had lost the
protection of a national government, transferred the whole matter to the police” (Ibid.: 167). While Arendt
discusses at length the way a refugee can become a subject of sovereign power by committing a crime, it is
less clear how the excluded space of the ‘bare life’ that Agamben describes becomes a site of policing.
Indeed, this is a problem that emerges in his work in his discussion of the camp. The camp is a site of
sovereign exception, where the emergence of ‘bare life’ becomes possible. It is the suspension of sovereignty,
and the exceptional character of the camp that allows the horrors like the ‘Final Solution’ to take place. In
Agamben’s (1998) words: “Only because the camps constitute a space of exception in the sense we have
examined – in which not only is law completely suspended but fact and law are completely confused – is
everything in the camps truly possible” (170).
This realm of possibility opened by the site of exclusion is in Agamben’s characterization of the camp, which
history has shown, is a site of tremendous horrors. However, if we take Rancière’s conceptualization of the
exclusion as the space of true politics, then there is no reason why – from the internal logic of sovereignty
– that the camp should represent these horrors. Thus, while the distinction of homo sacer is important for
conceptualizing the logic of sovereignty, it cannot explain the politicization of the camp.    
Schmitt’s work is instructive in explaining why the site of exclusion becomes the place of unlimited policing
and repression. This is possible through Schmitt’s distinction of the enemy and the friend. For Schmitt (1996)
“An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar
collectivity” (28). Thus if the site of exclusion is also the site of politics (via Rancière) then the place of
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 Bearing in mind the post-colonial insights into the problems of speaking for the ‘other,’, there is an inherent danger1
that my discussion of refugee agency (through my privileged speaking in an academic environment) will actually
disempower refugee voices. I would argue that this paper is at best an incomplete reconstruction and that it provides
a framework for thinking about refugee agency in a different way, but remains abstract because it does not (except
for a moment in the final section) include refugee voices. If there is a central point of this paper it is that the acts
performed by refugees are inherently political because of their excluded status, and any co-option my paper may
implicitly or explicitly perform cannot undermine that.  
exclusion rather than the abstract space of exclusion can become the sight of the enemy. This also means that
it is the agency of the refugee in the space of sovereign exclusion that becomes this ‘fighting collectivity.’
This also marks the distinction between the conceptual logic of sovereignty and the lived experience of
exclusion. Schmitt’s emphasis on the difference between enemy and friend does not require citizenship, but
instead the creation of the enemy provides the grounds for the policing of the camp. It also allows the
engagement between the enemy and friend in the form of Schmitt’s notion of the political. Like Rancière,
Schmitt believes that the founding principle of the political is the relationship between the friend and the
enemy, the included and excluded. What Agamben, Schmitt, Rancière, and even Arednt hold in common is
the emphasis on the excluded as the founding moment of the included. In this sense, refugee agency is not
only an important emphasis of politics; it represents the archetypical political act. We are indebted the
semblance of order provided by their exclusion and should be equally distressed at the way that this agency
is continually ignored.
It is critical then that refugee agency be treated with the consideration and attention that it deserves. One of
the dangers in discussing the issue of refugee agency is that when it does emerge in discourse it is often
through what Nyers has called a “unsavory” and “dangerous” agency (Nyers 2003: 1070). This is not
surprising given the way that the refugee serves to stabilize the distinction between enemy and friend and
maintain the sovereign order. However he makes the important distinction that this agency is a result of
refugees being “cast as the objects of securitized fears and anxieties” produced by the securitization and
criminalization discourses of the enemy rather than an engagement with the refugees actions (Ibid.). Refugee
agency becomes the product of a discourse that seeks to marginalize and politicize by reinforcing the
refugees ‘otherness’ and dismissing the ‘friends’ role in the creation, maintenance, and reproduction of this
order. The emphasis of this paper is to recover an empowering and productive form of refugee agency, which
illuminates the importance of the camp as a site of politics (via Rancière) and the possibilities their actions
create for systemic change.1
With this in mind, it becomes necessary to highlight some of the instances of taking-agency that were
outlined above. Two of the most publicized movements have been that of the sans-papiers in France and the
Non-Status Algerians in Canada. It is interesting to compare the similarities between these movements and
comments made by Arendt on the two situations whereby the refugee can be integrated through citizenship.
The first is the idea of naming, whereby the excluded becomes recognized by the nation-state by appealing
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to their distinctiveness from the rest of the ‘refugee masses.’ As Arendt (1951) disturbingly (and not without
cause bearing Agamben’s emphasis on bare life in mind) illustrates, the act of naming was important for
refugees because “just as a dog with a name has a better chance to survive than a stray dog who is just a dog
in general” (167). While Arendt relates this to fame (which I will address momentarily) I would argue that
in the cases of the sans-papiers and the Non-Status Algerians, the taking of a name was a political act that
forces recognition by nation-state. In the case of the sans-papiers the decision to choose a name took place
as an internal discussion; this point was emphasized in a poignant section of Theresa Hayter’s (2000)
examination of the movement.
The sans-papiers early on decided to refer to themselves as ‘undocumented’ rather than
‘clandestine’, their previous designation. Thus the essence of the movement is that the
people who were previously virtually in hiding, working illegally and in fear of deportation
and for that reason vulnerable to exploitation, decided to come out in the open, declare
themselves to the authorities and demand regularisation. In the process they took, and take,
great risks (143). 
 
Here we see how the act of naming was important both for recognition but also as a rallying site of political
activity. It is also clear how hazardous to the refugee their agency can be because of the multiple forms of
exclusion they face. In the case of Non-Status Algerians the group emerged because “the non-status refugees
have themselves taken the lead in the campaign to stop their deportations and regularise their status” (Nyers
2003: 1082).  Their distinction – through the process of naming – emerged in both cases because of the
actions of the refugees themselves taking a political place.
To return to Arendt (1951), she links the process of naming with fame, or the idea that ‘genius’ refugees are
granted exceptional status because of their individual characteristics (167). It is here that she fails to capture
the agency involved in the possibility of naming and reverts to the idea of the nation-state granting rights.
While publicity is important for the dissemination of the groups’ messages and for support, the refugees that
emerge are, as Nyers points, actively taking rights rather than waiting for them to be granted. To argue that
the fame of these groups might lead to their regularization misses the extent to which the claims of these
specific groups are for refugees and persons of non-status in general.  The Comité d’Action de Sans-Stauts
– of which the Non-status Algerians are part – “…have struggled to become democratic. Their politics favors
the ‘de-nationalisation of the state’, both in the sense of organising to stop their own deportations, but also
in the sense of regularizing the status of all non-status persons in Canada” (Nyers 2003: 1090).
This claim on behalf of the excluded is the type of politicization that Rancière argues is critical and
represents the taking-agency in the ways goals are articulated as demands. This is what Arendt’s discussion
of refugee agency misses and it is this type of agency that is most evident in the demands of the sans-papiers:
We demand papers so we are no longer the victims of arbitrary treatment by the authorities,
employers and landlords. We demand papers so that we are no longer vulnerable to
informants and blackmailers. We demand papers so that we no longer suffer the humiliation
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 See Nyers (2003) discussion of Žižek on page 1093.2
of controls based on our skin, detentions, deportations, the break-up of our families, the
constant fear (Hayter 2000: 143).     
The demand for regularization thus provides the source of a taking-agency while simultaneously creating
demands for changes that would deeply alter the configuration of included and excluded and the realm of
the ‘political.’
The importance of taking-agency for the refugee has specific political and emancipatory consequences. The
implications of regularizing refugee status and challenging the exclusions of sovereignty is an inherently
radical project which, as seen in Arednt and Agamben’s discussions, would require drastic changes to the
founding principles of the modern international system. As might be expected the issue of revolution and the
possibility for change is a focal point of discussion for many of these authors. To return to the idea of the
act, deciding what properly constitutes a ‘political act’ has been a serious point of contention between
authors. Thus the discussion of the importance of potentiality and actuality reemerges here. In Arendt’s On
Revolution she argues that deciding on the political act is a perpetual problem; “The trouble has always been
the same: those who went into the school of revolution learned beforehand the course a revolution must take.
It was the course of events, not the men [sic] of the revolution which they imitated” (Arendt 1973: 51).
Thus, there can be no predetermined path upon which revolutionary change will take place. The history of
revolutions remains fixed within the order of Being making it impossible to perfectly replicate the conditions
of revolution. Instead the supplement of the act (the agency of the revolutionary) is necessary for the
revolution to take place, making the path inherently spontaneous. As she argues “the revolutions started as
restorations or renovations, and that the revolutionary pathos of an entirely new beginning was born only in
the course of the event itself” (Ibid.: 30). This element of spontaneity is important for understanding the
potentiality in the act that, as argued by Žižek, helps maintain the consistency of Being. The problem arises
because for authors like Alain Badiou and Žižek who, like Arendt, emphasize ‘the event’; the act
retroactively reconfigures its own ‘path’ and the revolution can only be seen as such after it has taken place.
As others have pointed out  this limits true revolutionary moments to ones that completely reconfigure2
actuality, and as Žižek (1999) argues “a true act does not only retroactively change the rules of symbolic
space; is also disturbs the underlying fantasy” (200). In the Lacanian framework this ‘fantasy’ is the ‘Real’
of contemporary capitalism; which needs to be disrupted if true revolutionary moments are to take place.
While I would argue this is important, Agamben’s discussion of sovereignty’s exclusions and Rancière’s
emphasis on taking-agency means that these types of revolutionary changes would have to take place in the
acts of the present in order to eliminate the category of refugee. Supporting the agency of the refugee and
recovering it from marginalized discourses of exclusion reinforces these incremental acts that provide the
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possibility for revolutionary change. Adopting a position that predetermines what constitutes the true
political act does little to support and reinforce these ‘events’ as they take place. This is not to ignore that
these acts can be co-opted or to argue that refugees are the vanguard of the next revolution. In many cases
the demand for regularization is the demand to have equal status with the rest of society. But this is exactly
the ‘equality’ which Rancière argues is political, and why the excluded site is one of political action.
Supporting the banal and incremental movements towards regularization also represents a challenge to the
logic of sovereignty and the exceptions which constitute its logic. Recovering refugee agency from these
texts is an effort to show how the manifestations of sovereignty on an institutional level require the exclusion
of this agency in order to maintain its consistency.
Agency as Personal/Micro-political
While I believe that the sans-papiers and the Non-status Algerians are vital to conceptualizing the importance
of refugee agency, these accounts also miss the forms of agency that are performed at the personal level in
the refugee camps and detention centres. If the banal excluded places are also the sites of political acts, then
the refugee camp and the detention centre constitute sites of significance. Jennifer Hyndman’s examination
of refugee camps in Kenya is an important reference for this discussion, as well as the Desert Storm
publication produced in tandem with the protests and actions at the Woomera detention center in Australia
in 2002. I would also argue that at the micro-political level, one which Agamben is undoubtedly interested
– we see a reversal of the logic of logic of sovereignty. In his characterization,
The camp is the space that is opened up when the state of exception begins to become the
rule. In the camp the state of exception, which was essentially suspension of the rule of law
on the basis of a factual state of danger, is now given a permanent spatial arrangement,
which as such nevertheless remains outside the normal order (Agamben 1998: 169).
However, as I will argue below, what emerges is agency that resists the attempt to make the refugee a part
of bare life. The production of the apolitical non-subject in the site of exclusion is resisted by the refugees
at the micro-political level – the personal level – where the logic of sovereignty is reversed by the
experiences of the detainee. The abstract space of exclusion that the camp represents is for the refugee a site
of constant political resistance.  Thus when Agamben makes the argument that the camp is given a permanent
spatial arrangement, the analysis of refugee agency on a personal level speaks to the place of the camp. As
Hyndman’s analysis illustrates, the political geography of these excluded spaces reproduces the forms of
dehumanizing practices that are attempts to produce this bare life. Her examination of UNHCR headcounts
and the use of fences to herd refugees through gates in order to accurately assess their number illustrates the
way these practices treat refugees like undifferentiated cattle (Hyndman 2000: 128-9). While these practices
point to the refugee camp as the space where bare life emerges, Hyndman also found agency in refugee’s
resistance. As she described it: 
Accurate headcounts are important for procuring funds and food rations and for planning
purposes, but refugees have not willingly subjected themselves to the methods these
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accounts employ. In Kakuma camp…refugees subverted the census process on two
occasions, in April and June 1994. On one occasion they tore apart the enclosures built for
exercise, and on the other they kidnapped the staff participating in the headcount. Refugees
argued that the rounding up of people in fenced lots did not respect basic human dignity and
reminded them of the slavery of their people under Arab rule (Ibid.: 127-8).
Appealing to human dignity in a United Nations sponsored camp and recounting experiences of past slavery
are both powerful ways that the excluded place of the camp is also a place of where the refugees assert their
agency. These acts cannot be understood as ‘impossible activism,’ because they are taken by non-citizens
in the place of exclusion. Hyndman’s analysis combined with Rancière’s insights provide a powerful
corrective to the claims such as Agamben’s that: “The state of exception, which was essentially a temporary
suspension of the juridico-political order, now becomes a new and stable spatial arrangement inhabited by
the bare life that more and more can no longer be inscribed in that order” (Agamben 1998: 175). 
But in experience, the exact opposite has happened. The prisoners of the camps have rejected this
characterization and exerted agency continually and in innumerable ways. To the extent that these events
become publicized and the refugee claims are disseminated, they infect the distinctions maintained by the
logic of sovereignty. Recounting the experiences and the voices of refugees (as Hyndman does) creates the
space to discuss the consequences of these exclusions. There is important work to be done in emphasizing
these positive moments of agency against the discourses that otherwise reproduce these moments within the
framework of the enemy. 
The media attention and public debate surrounding the detention camps in Australia illustrates the
importance of emphasizing the agency of the refugee. In particular I will focus on two of the relatively
common forms of refugee agency; first the practices of protest, and second the way the body becomes a site
of resistance in detention centers. The policy of detention is founded on the growing use of refugees in
election and party campaigning, mobilized around discourses of fear, securitization, terrorism and threats.
While others have discussed the abundance of problems, contradictions, errors and lies utilized in these
approaches to migration and asylum, it is beyond the scope of this paper to give an adequate critique of these
tactics (see instead the many discussions of the ‘Tampa incident’). I aim to recognize how indefinite
detainment and the attempts to produce a ‘bare life’ in the detention center generate the forms of agency
found there. Instead of arguing this is a product of the grotesque forms of institutionalized violence, thus
implicitly asserting the importance of the detention center, I will instead argue that the detention centre
merely attempts to reconfigure refugee agency into bare life. This is an attempt to reverse the logic of bare
life by illustrating the importance of the ‘place’ for refugee agency. While the outline below is a crude and
cursory examination of an issue that requires much further exposition, it is an important first step to turning
the discourses of the refugee into more supportive and agency affirming forms. This helps to minimize
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(without dismissing) the discourse of refugees as victims, and opens up the possibilities for a focus on ways
that the logic of sovereignty tries to produce bare life in opposition to the agency of the refugee. 
The first form of personal agency most readily available to refugees in detention centres is protest and
mobilization. As the Woomera protests illustrated, the use of hunger strikes, mass gatherings, escape
attempts, and internal protests were used inside the camp to garner political support and attention. Globally
publicized hunger strikes were particularly effective in developing awareness that led to mobilization outside
the camp (Independent Media Center 2000). Subsequent protests inside and outside the camps help illustrate
the exclusionary space maintained by razor-wire, electrified fence, tear gas, and police.  As one account
explained: 
We originally went to the fence to see and be seen, but it quickly became an exercise in
architectural relocation. The fence came down and the bars were bent. Around 50 detainees
escaped – an action initiated by them – through a hole in the ‘metal-bar’ fence. A tense night
was spent in the protest camp, which was encircled by police (Melbourne Indymedia 2002:
5).
This account is valuable because it illustrates the blurred distinctions between the protests on each side of
the fence. The tearing down of the fence becomes a symbolic and geographical act, and the relocation of the
refugee from one policed camp (the detention center) to another (the protest camp) obscures the distinction
between these ‘political’ spaces. The act of protest by the refugees becomes indistinguishable from the
outside once the barrier is destroyed. The agency of the refugee manifests itself in the same acts as the
protests of the citizen, in the excluded space where bare life should make such activism impossible. Thus the
act of protest by the refugee symbolically and physically disrupts the effort to make the camp a site of bare
life by challenging the non-political space. 
The practices of lip sewing, self-mutilation, the highly publicized issue of refugees throwing themselves on
razor wire should also be understood as highly symbolic and markers of bodily agency. It is here that the
micro level of sovereignty manifests itself directly onto the refugee body. In a poignant letter by Sadiq Ali
a 19 year old Afghani refugee he explained the intensity of these inscriptions:
In Woomera everyone is became crazy. Men, women and children everyday they are cutting
their self with razor blade, drinking shampoo and hanging their selfs. They are committing
suicide. The ACM who are running the camp they are very bad with us. They are abusing
us and saying that you coming again to Australia. Australia is not your fathers country. This
is your punishment for coming to Australia. (Melbourne Indymedia 2002: 26). 
While the accounts (and there are many) of these disturbing practices are important for challenging the
existence of the detention centres; critiquing the practices of refuge ‘management;’ providing impetus for
laying responsibility with all the institutional actors involved; however, the emphasis of this paper requires
another narrative. By arguing against the detention centers without emphasizing refugee agency, we
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reproduce the responsibility to find solutions everywhere but with the refugees who live in these conditions.
The discourses that argue that these practices illustrate the ‘bare life’ of the excluded space of sovereignty
miss how the sovereign exclusion is being challenged in each of these moments. The constant requirement
to wait passively while the institutions of sovereignty decide at their bureaucratic leisure whether or not to
grant citizenship is being rejected in these acts. The refugees pay the price of the logic of sovereignty with
their bodies, while at the same moment illustrating how this logic is constantly contested. While this
extremely cursory example is only the beginning of an adequate examination of refugee agency in its varied
forms, it helps recover a glimpse of the possibility of radical change that would eliminate the category of
refugee altogether. 
Highlighting refugee agency provides a way to challenge the logic of sovereignty and the processes of
inclusion and exclusion it entails. Agamben’s analysis is an important starting point for understanding how
the internal logic of sovereignty functions. However, as this paper argued, it cannot adequately address the
institutional and personal forms of agency manifested in the spaces and places of exclusion. The experiences
of the sans-papiers and the Non-Status Algerians are instances of Rancière’s conceptualization of the
excluded taking agency and demanding change through the principle of equality. The experiences of refugees
in African and Australian refugee camps and detention centres points to the way that the ‘bare life’ of
exclusion is continually resisted even as sovereignty is inscribed on their bodies. However, the most
important consequence of this analysis is that the logic of sovereignty implicates citizens in the reproduction
and maintenance of these practices and it calls for their efforts to assist and support the forms of agency they
otherwise help to exclude. It is for this reason that citizens must be attentive to their own acts in the
perpetuation of the logic of sovereignty and how producing discourses that emphasize the agency of the
refugee help disrupt that logic.
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